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We consider the dynamics, existence and stability of the equilibrium states for large
populations of individuals who can play various types of non–cooperative games. The
players imitate the most attractive strategies, and the choice is motivated not only by
the material payoffs of the strategies, but also by their popularity in the population.
The parameter which determines the weights of both factors in the equilibrium states
has the same analytical form for all types of considered games, and is identified with
the sensitivity to reinforcements parameter in the Hernstein’s Matching Law. We
prove theorems of existence and uniqueness, and discuss examples of multiple locally
stable polymorphic equilibria for the considered types of games.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the evolutionary game theory the theoretical approach to model the dynamics of popula-
tions is based on the proportional fitness rule. If the random matching and imitation of the
individuals with highest payoffs are assumed, the equations which govern the evolution of
such populations are the celebrated replicator equations, cf. e.g. [1–6], and references cited
therein.
However, in general the individuals can be oriented not only toward imitating the highest
payoff strategies, but they can also take into account other, "noneconomic" factors, in par-
ticular popularity of strategies in the population. The idea of combining together the bias
towards imitating the strategies of the most payoff-successful agents and the strategies of
the majority is not new, cf. for example [7], where the ideas of imitating the successful, and
copying the majority (the conformist transmission), are put together to stabilize the coop-
eration in populations of individuals, see also [8] for another argument that noneconomic
factors influence human’s behavior.
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2We consider a theory of evolution of social systems, that generalizes the standard propor-
tional fitness rule of the evolutionary game theory. The biological fitness of a behavior,
strategy, measured by its payoff from interactions, is replaced by more general function,
the attractiveness of the behavior. The attractiveness of the strategy is assumed to depend
not only on its payoff, but also on its actual popularity (fraction) in the population. The
parameters of the attractiveness function describe different psychological characters of the
members of the population. We consider the model based on the generalized Cobb–Douglas
utility function, cf. [9], [10], [11]. We find a parameter that describes different personality
profiles of the players, and that can be identified with the sensitivity to reinforcement in
the Matching Law of mathematical psychology [12]. In our setting it determines stability
of polymorphic equilibria in all considered classes of games. We note that such equilibria
for games with two strategies played in infinite populations were found for example in the
aspiration–based models, cf. for example [13, 14], in general multi-person games, cf. [15], in
the models of social dilemmas with synergy and discounting, cf. [16], in the Stag-Hunt multi-
person games, cf. for example [17], in the multi-person Snowdrift game, cf. for example [18]
and references cited therein.
We prove theorems of the existence of polymorphic equilibria, and identify sufficient con-
ditions for their uniqueness for particular classes of the considered games. We also find
examples of the existence of more than one (locally) stable polymorphism.
In the next section we formulate the general model and discuss its basic properties. In
section III we briefly remind, for the convenience of the reader, an existence and uniqueness
theorem for a general class of two-person symmetric games with two strategies, played in
populations with social and material preferences, proved in [11]. We also provide examples
of multiple stable internal equilibria for two-person symmetric games with three strategies.
In section IV we discuss polymorphic equilibria for two-person asymmetric games with two
strategies, and in section V we consider the multi–person games, in particular the Public
Good game. In section VI we conclude and discuss some open problems.
II. MODEL
We consider an infinite homogeneous population of individuals who interact through a
random matching, playing at each instant of time a two–person or a multi–person non–
3cooperative game. The players have a finite number K of behavioral types (strategies). Let
Ni(t) denotes the number of individuals playing the strategy i, N = N1 + N2 + ...NK–
the fixed size of the system, pi = Ni/N –the frequency, or popularity of behavior i for
i = 1, 2, ..., K.
The players who play a strategy i review their strategy according to the Poisson process
with the arrival rate ri. We model the corresponding stochastic processes as a deterministic
flow. The balance conservation equations read, cf. e.g. [5], section 4.4:
p˙i(t) =
∑
j 6=i
[pjrjp
i
j − piripji ], i = 1, ...K, (1)
where pij is the probability that the agent playing the j strategy will switch to the i strategy.
We assume that pij is proportional to the attractiveness ui of the strategy i:
pij = cui. (2)
In general the attractiveness of a strategy can be a complicated function of various factors,
describing the state of the system and the characteristics of the players. Many social and
biological interactions are based on imitation processes, where individuals adopt more suc-
cessful and more popular strategies with larger probability than less successful and less pop-
ular ones. We choose for the attractiveness of the strategy i the generalized Cobb-Douglas
utility function, cf. [9–11]:
ui(t) = p
1−α
i ν
1−β
i , i = 1, ..., K, (3)
with (α, β) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1]. The formula (3) states that the attractiveness of a strategy
depends not only on the payoff of the strategy, but also on its actual popularity in the
population. The parameters α, β determine the responsiveness of the function ui to changes
of the current popularity and of the mean payoff of the action i. They define different social
and material preferences of the individuals, in other words their different personality profiles.
More attractive strategies ought to have an evolutionary advantage in the considered social
systems. Note that the attractiveness of the strategy i is increasing and concave function
of both arguments, i.e. of the mean payoff νi and of the popularity pi in the population.
In particular when the attractiveness reaches a higher level, the changes are slower. The
attractiveness of the strategy becomes zero if its mean payoff or its popularity in the pop-
ulation is zero. In the Appendix, p. A we define and characterize the ideal types of the
4personality profiles for α, β ∈ {0, 1}, and characterize their basic properties, cf. [10, 11].
All other values of the parameters α, β describe intermediate personality profiles. We show
below that the combination of these parameters
s =
1− β
α
, (4)
plays a crucial role in determining the polymorphic equlibria and their stability, and can be
identified with the sensitivity parameter which links the relative rates of reinforcements and
responses in the Hernstein’s Matching Law [12].
As postulated in (2), the strategies with higher attractivenesses have larger probability to
be imitated. Assuming that the arrival rates rj are constants, and rescaling the time we
obtain the system of equations which has the formal structure analogous to the replicator
equations:
p˙i(t) = u(
ui
u
− pi), u :=
K∑
j=1
uj, i = 1, 2, ..., K. (5)
Thus, the fraction pi of strategy i increases if its normalized attractiveness uiu ∈ [0, 1] is
bigger than the actual fraction of the strategy i, and decreases if it is smaller. In particular,
for α = β = 0, corresponding to Homo Afectualis (cf. the Appendix, p. A) the evolution
equations (5) are identical to the replicator equations of the evolutionary game theory.
All critical points of the dynamics (5) are obtained as solutions of the system of K − 1
algebraic equations
u1
p1
=
u2
p2
= ... =
uK
pK
. (6)
which, after substituting (3) is equivalent to
pi
p1
=
(
νi
ν1
)s
, i = 1, ..., K,
where νi is the mean payoff of strategy i. In particular the stability properties of the
solutions of eqs. (6) depend on the combination s of the parameters α, β, which characterize
the personality profile of the players, rather than separately on each of them. The sensitivity
parameter s plays an important role in the matching law in the operant response theory of the
mathematical psychology, in particular as a measure of the degree to which, in equilibrium,
the response ratio changes when the reinforcement ratio is modified, cf. for example [10–12],
and references cited therein.
5III. EQUILIBRIA FOR TWO-PERSON SYMMETRIC GAMES
In this section we consider populations which play symmetric 2-person games. For a con-
venience of the reader we first remind the results for the case of two strategies, proved in
[11].
A. 2-Person Games with 2 Strategies
For the symmetric 2-person games with two strategies (denoted 1,2), with the payoff matrix
1 2
1 a b
2 c d
(7)
where a, b, c, d are arbitrary positive numbers, we obtain the full characterization of the
equilibria. With the normalization condition p1 + p2 = 1 eq. (5) reduces to the evolution
equation
p˙1 = (1− p1)1−αp1−α1 [ν1−β1 (1− p1)α − ν1−β2 pα1 ], (8)
with ν1 = (a− b)p1 +S, ν2 = (c−d)p1 +d. For each personality profile (α, β) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]
there exist two pure equilibria of (5): p1 = 0 and p1 = 1 [for α = 1 we put ui(pi = 0) =
0, i = 1, 2]. The equilibria of eq. (5) in which each strategy has a non zero frequency will
be called Mixed Equilibria, and denoted ME. Each ME corresponds to a fixed point of
eq. (8). For the symmetric 2-person games the following theorem is true:
Theorem 1.
For the payoff matrix (7) with positive entries:
I. For each 0 ≤ s <∞ there exists at least one ME – the fixed point of the evolution equation
(8).
II. Denote B := (1 − s)d
c
+ (1 + s) b
a
, ∆ := B2 − 4 bd
ac
. If 1. ∆ ≤ 0, or 2. B ≥ 0, or 3.
bc ≥ ad, then ME is unique.
III. For each 0 ≤ s <∞ there exist at most three ME.
IV. There exist three ME iff ∆ > 0, B < 0, and U(z1)U(z2) < 0, where z1,2 := [−B∓
√
∆]/2,
and U(z) := lnz + s ln cz+d
az+b
, z > 0.
6V. If a ME is unique, then it is globally stable in (0, 1) under the considered dynamics. If
there are three ME, then the middle one is (locally) instable, the other two stable.
The statement I implies that the dependence of the attractiveness of a strategy on its
popularity implies the existence of at least one ME for all symmetric two-person games with
positive payoffs, including all types of the social dilemma games. In particular this "solves
the dilemma" of the Prisoner’s Dilemma population game. The statement II.2 implies that
for s ≤ 1 the cooperation level is unique, and does not depend on the initial distribution
of strategies. For the proof, interpretations and applications to various types of 2-person
games the reader is referred to [11].
B. 2-Person Symmetric Games with 3 Strategies
1. General results
2-person symmetric games with 3 strategies play important role in the population game
theory. First we formulate the general setting in the frame of populations with complex
personality profiles, then we discuss particular types of such games.
The general symmetric 2-person game with 3 strategies, denoted 1, 2, 3, has the payoff
matrix
1 2 3
1 a11 a12 a13
2 a21 a22 a23
3 a31 a32 a33
(9)
where we assume aij > 0 ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The mean payoffs of strategies 1, 2, 3 are defined
as
νi(t) =
3∑
j=1
aijpj(t), i = 1, 2, 3, (10)
with p3 = 1− p1 − p2. The dynamical system (5) has the form
p˙1 = p
1−α
1 (1− p1)ν1−β1 − p1[p1−α2 ν1−β2 + (p3)1−αν1−β3 ], (11)
p˙2 = p
1−α
2 (1− p2)ν1−β2 − p2[p1−α1 ν1−β1 + (p3)1−αν1−β3 ]. (12)
7For the 3-strategy games we define mixed equilibria (ME) of (11) as the critical points of the
above dynamical system with all nonzero coordinates pi, i = 1, 2, 3. We shall alternatively
use the term polymorphic equilibria. With notation
x :=
p2
p1
, y :=
p3
p1
(13)
the equations for ME can be written, using (3), (6), (10), in the form
x =
(
a21 + a22x+ a23y
a11 + a12x+ a13y
)s
, (14)
y =
(
a31 + a32x+ a33y
a11 + a12x+ a13y
)s
. (15)
The frequencies of the strategies in ME are obtained from the reverse formulas:
p1 =
1
1 + x+ y
, p2 = p1x, p3 = p1y. (16)
In general the number of ME and their stability depend on the payoff matrix and on the
sensitivity parameter s.
One of the most celebrated 3-strategy games is the Rock-Paper-Scissor (RPS) game, cf. for
example [5, 6]. The population of players with complex personality profiles, playing the
RSP game has been investigated in [19]. In particular, in the "standard" RPS game the
critical point (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
) is asymptotically stable for all α, β ∈ (0, 1]. For other properties
of the solutions, in particular the existence of limit cycles, the Hopf and the Boutin–like
bifurcations, the reader is referred to [19].
Below we analyze other important classes of 3–strategy symmetric games, in particular the
coordination games, for which there exist multiple stable polymorphic equilibria, and the
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game with three strategies AllD, AllC, TFT, with unique stable
ME.
2. Coordination Game
We consider the coordination game with 3 strategies and the payoff matrix
1 2 3
1 2 1 1
2 1 3 1
3 1 1 3
(17)
8We demonstrate the existence of three ME for s = 3. For s = 1 the system (14), (15) can be
solved explicitly. The unique nonnegative solution is x = y = 1
2
(1 +
√
3), which, according
to (16), gives the equilibrium state (p1, p2, p3) with the frequencies p1 = 2−
√
3, p2 = p3 =
1
2
(
√
3− 1).
For s = 2 the system (14), (15) is of the third order. In order to obtain analytical solution
we subtract (15) from (14), and obtain the equation
(x− y)(2 + x+ y)2 = 4(x− y)(1 + 2x+ 2y). (18)
It can be easily shown that (18) has positive solution only if y = x, in which case the solution
of the system (14), (15) is the pair (x0, x0), where x0 ∼= 2.45 is the unique positive root of
the polynomial
F (x) = 4x3 − 8x2 − 4x− 1. (19)
The corresponding unique equilibrium state reads (p1, p2, p3) ∼= (0.17, 0.415, 0.415). When
we farther increase the value of the sensitivity parameter s the uniqueness is lost. In Figure 1
we show time evolution of frequencies (p1, p2, p3) for two values of the sensitivity parameter s
for particular initial data, symmetric with respect to p10 (i.e. for p20 = p30). For s = 2.15 the
equilibrium is unique (not shown). For a value s ≥ s0 ∈ (2.15, 2.30) there emerge multiple
equilibria. For s = 3 (left diagram), and s = 3.75 (right diagram) there are three ME, two of
them stable, one unstable. In each diagram the frequencies reach asymptotically one of the
stable ME. Note the influence of the unstable equilibrium in the early stage of the evolution.
First the trajectory approaches the unstable symmetric ME (p1, p2, p3) ∼= (0.14, 0.43, 0.43),
then it tends to the locally stable equilibrium: (p1, p2, p3) ∼= (0.126, 0.225, 0.649). The other
"symmetric" locally stable ME is (p1, p2, p3) ∼= (0.126, 0.649, 0.225). The amount of time the
trajectory stays in a neighborhood of the unstable equilibrium depends on the sensitivity
parameter s, and on the personality profile parameters α, β. For s = 3.75 both locally stable
ME tend to the relevant vortexes of the game simplex, cf. the right diagram in Figure 1.
We explain the emergence of the multiple equilibria for s = 3. First we look for the symmetric
solution p2 = p3, i.e. x = y. The system (14), (15) reduces to one equation
8x4 − 40x3 − 24x2 − 4x− 1 = 0. (20)
The unique positive root of the polynomial in (20) is x ∼= 5.556. The corresponding equi-
librium reads (p1, p2, p3) ∼= (0.082, 0.459, 0.459). There are two other, symmetric ME.
9The first zero gives the ME: (p1, p2, p3) ∼= (0.047, 0.057, 0.896). As expected from the
symmetry of the second and third strategy, the second zero gives the "symmetric" ME:
(p1, p2, p3) ∼= (0.047, 0.896, 0.057). There are also four "partially mixed" equilibria: two on
the edge p1 = 0, and one on each other edges, in the neighborhood of the corners 2 and
3, i.e. near p2 = 1 and p3 = 1. For increasing values of the sensitivity parameter s the
stable equilibria approach the relevant edges of the game simplex. In the Appendix, p. B we
FIG. 1: Time evolution of frequencies p1, p2, p3 for the coordination game (17). Left: s = 3, right:
s = 3.75.
prove the existence and uniqueness theorem for another class of the asymmetric coordination
games, in which both players are better off if they play different strategies (anti–coordination
games).
3. Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Another interesting example of three–strategy games is the 2–person, 3–strategy finitely
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game with the payoff matrix
AllC AllD TFT
AllC Rm Sm Rm
AllD Tm Pm T + P (m− 1)
TFT Rm S + P (m− 1) Rm
(21)
where T > R > P ≥ S are the payoffs in the one-shot PD game, AllC (AllD) is the strategy:
play always C (play always D), TFT is the strategy Tit for Tat, and m is the number of
rounds.
10
In the classical replicator dynamics, with the payoff from TFT additionally reduced by a
small value (the cost of playing TFT) it has been shown in [21], that the population evolves
through the cycles of cooperation and defection.
For the general matrix (21) we checked numerically the existence and uniqueness of ME
for for wide ranges of the payoffs T > R > P ≥ S and of the parameters m, s. Moreover,
the share (sum of the frequencies) of the cooperative strategies AllC and TFT decreases for
increasing ratio T
R
and increasing number of rounds, whereas for increasing m it increases,
in agreement with intuition.
For the Weak Prisoner’s Dilemma (P = S = 0) we prove
Corollary 2.
There exists an unique ME: (p1, p2, p3) = ( 12+a ,
a
2+a
, 1
2+a
), where a = [T (m+1)
2mR
]s, of the game
(21) with P = S = 0, for all nonnegative sensitivity parameters s.
Proof. Eq. (15) for the ME gives y = 1. Eq. (14) gives a = [T (m+1)
2m
]s, and the result follows
from (16).
Note that for the increasing ratio T
R
the shares of the AllC and TFT players in ME decrease,
whereas for increasing m they increase, as in the case of the general payoff matrix (21).
IV. 2-PERSON ASYMMETRIC GAMES
A. General Results
In this section we consider 2-person games played between members of two populations with
(in general) different personality profiles. The members of both populations choose between
two strategies A and B. The payoff matrix reads (a1, a2) (b1, b2)
(c1, c2) (d1, d2)
 , (22)
with nonnegative entries. In general the strategies in both populations may be different
meanings. For simplicity we do not use different notation for the relevant pairs of strategies.
The row players belong to the population i = 1, and the column ones to i = 2. We denote
xi, i = 1, 2, the fraction of population i which plays strategy A.
11
Let (αi, βi) describe the personality profile of the individuals of population i, i = 1.2. The
members of each population may put different weights to the payoffs and popularities of the
available strategies in the imitation process.
We define uij–the attractiveness of strategy j ∈ {A,B} in population i ∈ {1, 2}:
uiA = x
1−αi
i ν
1−βi
Ai , (23)
uiB = (1− xi)1−αiν1−βiBi , (24)
where νji is the mean payoff from strategy j in population i:
νA1 = a1x2+b1(1−x2), νB1 = c1x2+d1(1−x2), νA2 = a2x1+c2(1−x1), νB2 = b2x1+d2(1−x1).
Thus, the attractiveness of each strategy of a population depends on two factors: the ”so-
cial” one, represented by the fraction, popularity of the strategy in the population, and the
”economic” one, represented by the mean payoff of this strategy in the considered popula-
tion. Note that the social factor depends on the composition of the considered population,
whereas the economic one depends on the composition of the second population. This can be
interpreted in the following way: the members of each population determine their strategy
choice observing popularity of the available strategies in their own population, and their
payoffs from the interactions with the members of the other population.
The dynamics (5), written for asymmetric games, reads
x˙1 = (1− x1)x1−α11 ν1−β1A1 − x1(1− x1)1−α1ν1−β1B1 ,
x˙2 = (1− x2)x1−α22 ν1−β2A2 − x2(1− x2)1−α2ν1−β2B2 .
(25)
Note that for αi = βi = 0, i = 1, 2 the system (25) reduces to the replicator dynamics for
asymmetric games, cf. for example [5, 6]. The pairs of (x1, x2): (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)
are equilibria in pure strategies of (25). They correspond to the situations in which each
population plays only one of two available strategies. We are looking for the mixed equilibria
(ME) in which both strategies have nonzero frequencies for each population.
With the substitution zi = xi1−xi , i = 1, 2 the system reads
z˙1 = z
1−α1
1 (1 + z1)
α1ν1−β1A1 − z1(1 + z1)α1ν1−β1B1 ,
z˙2 = z
1−α2
2 (1 + z2)
α2ν1−β2A2 − z2(1 + z2)α2ν1−β2B2 .
(26)
From (26) we obtain the algebraic equations for ME:
z¯1 =
(
a1z¯2+b1
c1z¯2+d1
)s1
, z¯2 =
(
a2z¯1+b2
c2z¯1+d2
)s2
, (27)
12
where
si =
1− βi
αi
, i = 1, 2 (28)
denotes sensitivity of players in population i. Thus, for the asymmetric 2-person games
the ME are determined by relevant combinations of parameters s1, s2 which describe the
personalities of players respectively in the first and the in the second population. In the
next subsections we show the existence of ME for typical asymmetric games. Here we prove
that, contrary to the replicator equations for asymmetric 2-person games, the solutions can
not be periodic.
Theorem 3. The system (26) does not have periodic solutions.
Proof. We define the function φ(z1, z2) = [z1(1 + z1)α1z2(1 + z2)α2 ]−1, and note that
∂(φz˙1)
∂z1
+
∂(φz˙2)
∂z2
= −α1z
−(α1+1)
1 ν
1−β1
A1
z2(1 + z2)α2
− α2z
−(α2+1)
2 ν
1−β2
A2
z1(1 + z1)α1
< 0,
for z1, z2 > 0. Applying the criterion Dulac–Bendixson we obtain the thesis.
B. Asymmetric coordination games
1. Pure coordination games
We consider the model defined in the previous section for the asymmetric coordination games
with the payoff matrix  (a1, a2) (0, 0)
(0, 0) (d1, d2)
 , (29)
and ai 6= 0, di 6= 0, i = 1, 2, played between two populations with different personality pro-
files. Such games will be called pure (asymmetric) coordination games. We can for example
think about two populations of different sexes, i = 1 and i = 2 denote respectively men’s
and woman’s populations. For a1 > d1, a2 < d2 this corresponds to the well known Battle of
Sexes game. Players from each population evaluate the available strategies according to their
attractiveness, calculated for each of two populations i = 1, 2 with the personality profiles
(αi, βi), according to formulas (23). With notation (28) we prove the following theorem
Theorem 4.
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If s1s2 6= 1 then there exists a unique ME of the dynamics (26) for the populations with the
payoff matrices (29):
z¯1 =
(
a1a
s2
2
d1d
s2
2
) s1
1−s1s2
, z¯2 =
(
as11 a2
ds11 d2
) s2
1−s1s2
. (30)
The equilibrium (30) is locally asymptotically stable if s1s2 < 1, and unstable if s1s2 > 1.
If s1s2 = 1 then for (a1/b1)s1as22 6= 1 there are no ME, for (a1/b1)s1as22 = 1 there exists the
family of ME z¯1 = c, z¯2 = cs1(a2/b2)s2, where c is an arbitrary positive constant.
Proof: cf. the Appendix, p. C. Numerical simulations indicate that if the equilibrium (30) is
locally stable then it attracts all investigated trajectories from the interior of the simplex of
the game. We note that the replicator dynamics for the considered asymmetric games (which
formally coresponds to infinite sensitivities in our dynamics, has an unique ME, which is
Lapunov stable. In Appendix, p. D, we prove analogous existence and uniqueness theorem
for another class of asymmetric games (anti–coordination games), in which the players are
better off if they use different strategies.
2. Coordination games with multiple ME
In asymmetric coordination games the positivity of payoffs plays crucial role in the unique-
ness problem, and in determining the polymorphic equilibria. In the pure coordination
games considered above the ME is unique, whereas in general coordination games multiple
stable polymorphic equilibria are possible. For example, the 2-person asymmetric game with
the payoff matrix  (3, 2) (1, 1)
(1, 1) (2, 3)
 , (31)
has, for s1 = s2 = 3, three ME, corresponding to (x1 ≈ 0.92, x2 ≈ 0.82), (x1 = 0.6, x2 =
0.40), and (x1 ≈ 0.18, x2 ≈ 0.08), as can be checked solving (27). Two equilibria are locally
stable, one unstable, cf. Fig. 2.
14
FIG. 2: Examples of trajectories and critical points for the asymmetric coordination game (31):
a1 = d2 = 3, a2 = d1 = 2, bi = ci = 1, i = 1, 2. All six displayed trajectories start from a
neighborhood of the points (0, 1) or (1, 0).
V. MULTI-PERSON GAMES
A. General results
In this section we consider multi-person one-shot symmetric games in which each of N
players chooses one of two actions: C or D, C stands for cooperation, D for defection. In
order to obtain symmetric notation and formulas, we define n := N − 1, and from now on
we consider the n+ 1–person games. This allows to define: ak : the payoff of player C, when k others play C,bk : the payoff of player D, when k others play D,
where k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, and ak, bk ≥ 0.
Let x denote the fraction of the population that plays C. The mean payoffs from both
strategies are respectively
νC =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
xk(1− x)n−kak,
νD =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
xk(1− x)n−kbk.
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The evolution equation reads
x˙ = (1− x)x1−αν1−βA − x(1− x)1−αν1−βB , (32)
Substituting z = x
1−x we obtain
z˙ = f(z)
((
WA(z)
WB(z)
)1−β
− zα
)
, (33)
where WA(z) =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
akz
k, WB(z) =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
bkz
k, and f(z) is a positive function which
does not influence the equilibria and their stabilities but only the speed of the evolution.
Stationary points of the dynamics described by (33) can be obtained solving the equation
z¯ =
(
WA(z¯)
WB(z¯)
)s
,
where s = 1−β
α
is the previously defined sensitivity coefficient. We prove the following
Theorem 5.
The dynamics (32) of the symmetric (n+1)–person game has at most 2n+1 mixed equilibria.
Proof. We define the function U(z) : R+ → R+:
U(z) = s ln
WA(z)
WB(z)
− ln z.
Zeros of U are stationary points of the considered dynamics, and sgn(U(z)|z0) = sgn(z˙|z0).
It is sufficient to show that U(z) = 0 at at most 2n + 1 points in (0,+∞). To this end we
calculate
U ′(z) = s
W ′A
WA
− sW
′
B
WB
− 1
z
=
sW ′AWBz − sW ′BWAz −WAWB
WAWBz
.
The polynomial sW ′AWBz − sW ′BWAz −WAWB is at most of the order 2n, therefore U ′(z)
has at most 2n zeros. Since between each two zeros of U there has to be a zero of U ′(z), the
function U(z) can have at most 2n+ 1 zeros.
Theorem 6.
For the (n+1)–person games with two strategies and with all payoffs positive there exists at
least one mixed equilibrium.
Proof. Due to continuity of the considered dynamics is enough to prove that both boundary
equilibrium points corresponding to pore equilibria: x = 0, x = 1 are unstable. This will
be proved in two lemmas below.
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Lemma 1. Let p = min {i : ai > 0}, r = min {i : bi > 0}. If
ps > rs+ 1, or (34)
ps = rs+ 1 and
(
n
p
)
ap <
(
n
r
)
br, (35)
then the point x = 0 is asymptotically stable. If
ps < rs+ 1, or
ps = rs+ 1 and
(
n
p
)
ap >
(
n
r
)
br,
then the point x = 0 is unstable.
Proof. We note that
WA(z) =
(
n
p
)
apz
p +O(zp),
WB(z) =
(
n
r
)
brz
r +O(zr).
We obtain
for the condition (34): lim
z→0
U(z) = lim
z→0
ln
(
(WA(z))
s
(WB(z))sz
)
= −∞,
for the condition (35): lim
z→0
U(z) = ln
((
n
p
)
ap(
n
r
)
br
)
< 0.
In our one dimensional system the stationary point z¯ > 0 is asymptotically stable iff
∃ε>0 z˙|(z¯,z¯+ε) < 0 ∧ z˙|(z¯−ε,z¯) > 0. The sufficient condition is U ′(z¯) < 0. On the contrary, if
U ′(z¯) > 0, then the point z¯ is unstable. Analogously, the sufficient condition for stability of
z = 0 reads: limz→0 U(z) < 0. Since sgn(U(z0)) = sgn(z˙|z0), then in the cases (34) and (35)
we have z˙ < 0 for a certain εz > 0 and z ∈ (0, εz). From the equality x˙ = z˙(1+z)2 it follows,
that then for a certain εx > 0 and x ∈ (0, εx) we have x˙ < 0.
The proof of the second part of Lemma 1 is analogous.
Lemma 2. Let p′ = max {i : ai > 0}, r′ = max {i : bi > 0}. If
p′s > r′s+ 1, or
p′s = r′s+ 1 and
(
n
p′
)
ap′ >
(
n
r′
)
br′ ,
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then the point x = 1 is asymptotically stable. If
p′s < r′s+ 1, or
p′s = r′s+ 1 and
(
n
p′
)
ap′ <
(
n
r′
)
br′ ,
then the point x = 1 is unstable.
Proof. It is enough to apply Lemma 1 with the strategies interchanged.
The above theorem guarantees the existence, however not uniqueness of the ME (we remind
that for the 2-person symmetric games with positive payoffs the uniqueness has been proved
for s ≤ 1. Below we give an example of a 3-person game with positive payoffs and three ME
for the sensitivity s = 1.
Example
Let a0 = 5, a1 = a2 = 1, b0 = 1, b1 = 23 , b2 = 5
1
3
. The corresponding payoff matrix reads:
11 12 22
1 5 1 1
2 1 2
3
51
3
(36)
Note that this game can be treated as a coordination game (the players are better off if they
play the same strategies). The equation for ME reads:
z =
[
a0z
2 + a1z + a2
b0z2 + b1z + b2
]s
, (37)
which, for s = 1 has three positive roots, resulting, after substitution z = x
1−x in three ME:
x1 =
1
4
, x2 =
1
2
, , x1 =
3
4
. We checked that x1 and x3 are locally stable, and x2 unstable.
B. Public Goods game
We apply the general results of the previous subsection to the important (n + 1)–person
game–the Public Goods (PG) game. In this game each of (n+1) players receives an amount
g, and chooses one of two actions: C: Contribute with g into the common pool or D: Do
not contribute. Let k among n + 1 players choose C. The amount kg in the common pool
is multiplied by r, n + 1 > r > 1, and distributed equally among n + 1 players. Using the
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notation for the payoffs in the (n+1)-person game introduced in (VA) and the normalization
g = 1 we obtain the following payoffs of the strategies respectively C and D in the PG game:
ak = (k + 1)p, bk = kp+ 1, p :=
r
n+ 1
,
1
n+ 1
< p < 1. (38)
Below we investigate equilibria for the PG game. We show that their number and stability
properties are the same as of a 2-person Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game, of which it is the
multiple, see definition below. Thus, since any 2-person PD with positive payoffs has at
least one and at most three internal equilibria, the same is true for the PG game. We begin
with the definition of the multiple of any 2-person symmetric game.
Definition 1. Multiple of the 2-person symmetric game with the payoff matrix a b
c d

is the (n+1)–person symmetric game with the payoffs
ak = ka+ (n− k)b,
bk = kc+ (n− k)d.
k = 0, 1, ..., n. Thus, in the multiple of the 2-person symmetric game the payoff of a player
is the sum of his payoffs from all the 2-person games with the other n players. We prove
Lemma 3. Any 2-person symmetric game and its multiple have the same equilibria in the
dynamics (32). Moreover, the stability properties of the equilibria of both games are the
same.
Proof. For the multiple of the 2-person game we have
WA(z) =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
(ka+ (n− k)b)zk =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
k(a− b)zk + n
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
bzk
= n(a− b)z
n∑
k=1
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
zk−1 + nb(1 + z)n
= n(a− b)z(1 + z)n−1 + nb(1 + z)n = n(1 + z)n−1(z(a− b) + (1 + z)b)
= n(1 + z)n−1(za+ b),
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and analogously WB(z) = n(1+z)n−1(zc+d). As previously we define the function U , zeros
of which are stationary points of the considered dynamics:
U(z) = s ln
WA(z)
WB(z)
− ln z = s ln
(
za+ b
zc+ d
)
− ln z.
Thus, the function U(z) for the (n + 1)–person game which is the multiple of the 2-person
game is the same as for the 2-person game. In consequence both games have the same
equilibria, and the stability properties of the corresponding equilibria are identical.
Now we come back to the PG (n+1)–person game with the payoffs ak = (k+1)p, bk = kp+1,
with 1
n+1
< p < 1. We note that they can be rewritten as
ak = kp
n+ 1
n
+ (n− k)p 1
n
,
bk = k
pn+ 1
n
+ (n− k) 1
n
.
It means that Public Goods game is the multiple of the PD game with the payoff matrix p(n+1)n pn
pn+1
n
1
n
 , (39)
therefore, from Lemma 3 it is sufficient to investigate the dynamics for the PD game (39).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we discussed the evolutionary dynamics of populations of agents with complex
personality profiles, which is governed by the attractiveness of strategies rather than by their
payoffs. The agents can play various types of non-cooperative games, including general two–
person asymmetric games and multi-person games. The profiles determine the weights the
agents associate to the payoffs and the popularities of the available strategies. It turns out
that the polymorphic equilibria and their stability properties are in general determined by
a single sensitivity to reinforcement parameter which characterizes the population. The
parameter has an interpretation in the Matching Law of mathematical psychology. For
general characters there exist stable mixed equilibria of the considered dynamics, not present
in the classical evolutionary game theory approach based on the replicator dynamics.
There are various interesting open problems related to the presented research: generaliza-
tion for systems with more behavioral types, introduction of other, more general types of
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attractiveness functions, which for example take into account the speed of the changes of the
actual composition of population. It will also be interesting to allow the actors to change
their personalities during the interactions and/or to react with delay to received impulses
(information lag). In particular, the delay can be present only in the social or only in the
material part of the attractiveness fuction. Models with a finite number of heterogeneous
agents with different personality characteristics seem to be another interesting area of future
research.
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VII. APPENDIX
A. Ideal personality profiles
HE (Homo Economicus): α = 1, β = 0. It means that HE assesses attractiveness of the
action exclusively through its effectiveness (ui = νi). HE is interested exclusively in the
future prospects,
HS (Homo Sociologicus): α = 0, β = 1. The HS assesses attractiveness of the action only
through its popularity, the past effect for him/her (ui = pi). HS is insensitive to the payoffs
of the game.
HT (Homo Transcendentalis): α = β = 1. It is an ideal type, for which every action has the
same attractiveness (ui = 1). It describes a personality not interested in the effectiveness of
a behavior or in its propensity, but rather by some other values. Thus, HT is the ideal type
insensitive to the payoffs and the popularities of the strategies.
HA (Homo Afectualis): α = β = 0. The attractiveness function takes the form ui = νipi
The corresponding evolution equations reduce to the standard replicator equations. Inserting
α = 0 into (5) we obtain a generalized form of replicator equations, in which the material
payoffs are included in nonlinear way:
p˙i = pi
∑
j=1,...K
pj[ν
1−β
i − ν1−βj ], i = 1, ...K. (40)
In particular for β = 0 we obtain the usual replicator equations for the two-person symmetric
games with K strategies.
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B. Symmetric anti-coordination games with 3 strategies
Here we consider the 3–strategy game with the payoff matrix
1 2 3
1 0 a1 a2
2 a1 0 a3
3 a2 a3 0
(41)
ai > 0, i = 1, 2, 3, in which the players are better off if they use different strategies, then
otherwise. We prove
Corollary 7. There exists the unique ME (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
) of the game (41) with ai = a > 0, i =
1, 2, 3 for all s > 0.
Proof. We check that x = y = 1, which corresponds to the above ME, satisfy (14), (15).
For x 6= y, subtracting (15) from (14) we obtain the equation
x− y = (1 + y)
s − (1 + x)s
(x+ y)s
,
which can not be satisfied due to different signs of both sides.
For the general anti–coordination game with arbitrary aij, s such that aij > akk > 0 for all
k and all i 6= j, i, j, k = 1, 2, 3, we checked numerically the existence of an unique ME for
all considered numerical values of these parameters.
C. Asymmetric pure coordination games
Proof. The dynamics (26) for the pure coordination game (a1, a2) (0, 0)
(0, 0) (d1, d2)
 , (42)
with ai > 0, di > 0, i = 1, 2, reads
z˙1 = z
1−α1
1 (1 + z1)
α1
(
a1z2
1+z2
)1−β1 − z1(1 + z1)α1 ( d11+z2)1−β1 ,
z˙2 = z
1−α2
2 (1 + z2)
α2
(
a2z1
1+z1
)1−β2 − z2(1 + z2)α2 ( d21+z1)1−β2 . (43)
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The equations (27) for ME of (43) read: z¯1 =
(
a1
d1
z¯2
)s1
, z¯2 =
(
a2
d2
z¯1
)s2
. Linearization of
(43) around the equilibrium (30) leads to the matrix−α1(1 + z¯1)α1
(
d1
1+z¯2
)1−β1
(1− β1)z¯1−α11 (1 + z¯1)α1 z¯−β12
(
a1
1+z¯2
)1−β1
(1− β2)z¯1−α22 (1 + z¯2)α2 z¯−β21
(
a2
1+z¯1
)1−β2 −α2(1 + z¯2)α2( d21+z¯1)1−β2

with a negative trace. Using ( 30) we show that if s1s2 < 1 then the determinant of the
matrix is positive, therefore both eigenvalues have negative real parts, i.e. the equilibrium
(z¯1, z¯2) is locally asymptotically stable. Analogously, if s1s2 > 1, then the determinant is
negative, therefore at least one eigenvalue has positive real part, i.e. the equilibrium (z¯1, z¯2)
is unstable. The proof of other statements is omitted.
D. Asymmetric anti–coordination games
We apply the general model for the asymmetric anti–coordination game with the payoff
matrix  (0, 0) (b1, b2)
(c1, c2) (0, 0)
 , (44)
and bi > 0, ci > 0, i = 1, 2. We prove the following theorem
Theorem 8.
If s1s2 6= 1 then there exists a unique polymorphic equilibrium of the dynamics (26) for the
populations with the payoff matrices (44):
z¯1 =
(
b1c
s2
2
c1b
s2
2
) s1
1−s1s2
, z¯2 =
(
cs11 b2
bs11 c2
) s2
1−s1s2
. (45)
If s1s2 = 1 then we have the same situation as in Theorem 4 with obvious changes of the
payoff parameters.
The equilibrium (45) is locally asymptotically stable if s1s2 < 1, and unstable if s1s2 > 1.
The proof is analogous as in Theorem 4 and is omitted. Numerical simulations indicate that
if the equilibrium (30) is locally stable then it attracts all investigated trajectories from the
interior of the simplex of the game.
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E. Asymmetric non-coordination games
We consider populations which play asymmetric game with the payoff matrices (a, 0) (0, b)
(0, c) (d, 0)
 . (46)
This game can be considered as a two-population variant of the Matching Pennies game.
The dynamics (26) for the game (46), with positive payoffs a, b, c, d reads
z˙1 = z
1−α1
1 (1 + z1)
α1
(
az2
1+z2
)1−β1 − z1(1 + z1)α1 ( d1+z2)1−β1 ,
z˙2 = z
1−α2
2 (1 + z2)
α2
(
c
1+z1
)1−β2 − z2(1 + z2)α2 ( bz11+z1)1−β2 . (47)
The equations for equilibria have the form z¯1 =
(
az¯2
d
)s1 , z¯2 = ( bcz¯1)s2 , with the solution
z¯1 =
(
acs2
dbs2
) s1
1+s1s2
, z¯2 =
(
bds1
cas1
) s2
1+s1s2
. (48)
We prove that the equilibrium (48) is locally asymptotically stable for all s1, s2 ∈ R+.
Linearization of (47) around the stationary point (48) leads to the matrix−α1(1 + z¯1)α1
(
d
1+z¯2
)1−β1
(1− β1)z¯1−α11 (1 + z¯1)α1 z¯−β12
(
a
1+z¯2
)1−β1
−(1− β2)z¯2(1 + z¯2)α2 z¯−β21
(
b
1+z¯1
)1−β2 −α2(1 + z¯2)α2( bz11+z¯1)1−β2

which has negative trace and positive determinant.
